Thursday, February 24, 2022

Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS released

The Ubuntu team is pleased to announce the release of Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS
(Long-Term Support) for its Desktop, Server, and Cloud products, as well
as other flavours of Ubuntu with long-term support.

Like previous LTS series, 20.04.4 includes hardware enablement stacks
for use on newer hardware. This support is offered on all architectures.

Ubuntu Server defaults to installing the GA kernel; however you may
select the HWE kernel from the installer bootloader.

As usual, this point release includes many updates, and updated
installation media has been provided so that fewer updates will need to
be downloaded after installation. These include security updates and
corrections for other high-impact bugs, with a focus on maintaining
stability and compatibility with Ubuntu 20.04 LTS.

Kubuntu 20.04.4 LTS, Ubuntu Budgie 20.04.4 LTS, Ubuntu MATE 20.04.4 LTS,
Lubuntu 20.04.4 LTS, Ubuntu Kylin 20.04.4 LTS, Ubuntu Studio 20.04.4 LTS,
and Xubuntu 20.04.4 LTS are also now available. More details can be found
in their individual release notes:

https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FocalFossa/ReleaseNotes#Official_flavours

Maintenance updates will be provided for 5 years for Ubuntu Desktop,
Ubuntu Server, Ubuntu Cloud, and Ubuntu Core. All the remaining
flavours will be supported for 3 years. Additional security support is
available with ESM (Extended Security Maintenance).

To get Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS
-------------------------

In order to download Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS, visit:

https://ubuntu.com/download

Users of Ubuntu 18.04 LTS will be offered an automatic upgrade to
20.04.4 LTS via Update Manager. For further information about upgrading,
see:

https://help.ubuntu.com/community/FocalUpgrades

As always, upgrades to the latest version of Ubuntu are entirely free of
charge.

We recommend that all users read the 20.04.4 LTS release notes, which
document caveats and workarounds for known issues, as well as more
in-depth notes on the release itself. They are available at:

https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FocalFossa/ReleaseNotes

If you have a question, or if you think you may have found a bug but
aren't sure, you can try asking in any of the following places:

#ubuntu on irc.libera.chat
https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-users
https://ubuntuforums.org
https://askubuntu.com


Help Shape Ubuntu
-----------------

If you would like to help shape Ubuntu, take a look at the list of ways
you can participate at:

https://discourse.ubuntu.com/contribute


About Ubuntu
------------

Ubuntu is a full-featured Linux distribution for desktops, laptops,
clouds and servers, with a fast and easy installation and regular
releases. A tightly-integrated selection of excellent applications is
included, and an incredible variety of add-on software is just a few
clicks away.

Professional services including support are available from Canonical and
hundreds of other companies around the world. For more information
about support, visit:

https://ubuntu.com/support


More Information
----------------

You can learn more about Ubuntu and about this release on our website
listed below:

https://ubuntu.com/

To sign up for future Ubuntu announcements, please subscribe to Ubuntu's
very low volume announcement list at:

https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-announce

On behalf of the Ubuntu Release Team,
Ɓukasz 'sil2100' Zemczak

--
ubuntu-announce mailing list
ubuntu-announce@lists.ubuntu.com
Modify settings or unsubscribe at: https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-announce

LibreSSL 3.5.0 Released

We have released LibreSSL 3.5.0, which will be arriving in the
LibreSSL directory of your local OpenBSD mirror soon. This is a
development release for the 3.5.x branch, and we appreciate additional testing
and feedback before the final release coming soon with OpenBSD 7.1.

It includes the following changes:

* New Features
- The RFC 3779 API was ported from OpenSSL. Many bugs were fixed,
regression tests were added and the code was cleaned up.
- Certificate Transparency was ported from OpenSSL. Many internal
improvements were made, resulting in cleaner and safer code.
Regress coverage was added. libssl does not yet make use of it.
* Portable Improvements
- Fixed various POSIX compliance and other portability issues
found by the port to the Sortix operating system.
- Add libmd as platform specific libraries for Solaris.
Issue reported from (ihsan <at> opencsw org) on libressl ML.
- Set IA-64 compiler flag only if it is HP-UX with IA-64.
Suggested from Larkin Nickle (me <at> larbob org) by libressl ML.
- Enabled and scheduled Coverity scan.
Contributed by Ilya Shipitsin (chipitsine <at> gmail com> on github.
* Compatibility Changes
- Most structs that were previously defined in the following headers
are now opaque as they are in OpenSSL 1.1:
bio.h, bn.h, comp.h, dh.h, dsa.h, evp.h, hmac.h, ocsp.h, rsa.h,
x509.h, x509v3.h, x509_vfy.h
- Switch TLSv1.3 cipher names from AEAD- to OpenSSL's TLS_
OpenSSL added the TLSv1.3 ciphersuites with "RFC names" instead
of using something consistent with the previous naming. Various
test suites expect these names (instead of checking for the much
more sensible cipher numbers). The old names are still accepted
as aliases.
- Subject alternative names and name constraints are now validated
when they are added to certificates. Various interoperability
problems with stacks that validate certificates more strictly
than OpenSSL can be avoided this way.
- Attempt to opportunistically use the host name for SNI in s_client
* Bug fixes
- In some situations, the verifier would discard the error on an
unvalidated certificate chain. This would happen when the
verification callback was in use, instructing the verifier to
continue unconditionally. This could lead to incorrect decisions
being made in software.
- Avoid an infinite loop in SSL_shutdown()
- Fix another return 0 bug in SSL_shutdown()
- Handle zero byte reads/writes that trigger handshakes in the
TLSv1.3 stack
- A long standing memleak in libtls CRL handling was fixed
* Internal Improvements
- Cache the SHA-512 hash instead of the SHA-1 hash and cache
notBefore and notAfter times when X.509 certificates are parsed.
- The X.509 lookup code has been simplified and cleaned up.
- Fixed numerous issues flagged by coverity and the cryptofuzz
project
- Increased the number of Miller-Rabin checks in DH and DSA
key/parameter generation
- Started using the bytestring API in libcrypto for cleaner and
safer code
- Convert {i2d,d2i}_{,EC_,DSA_,RSA_}PUBKEY{,_bio,_fp}() to templated
ASN1
- Convert ASN1_OBJECT_new() to calloc()
- Convert ASN1_STRING_type_new() to calloc()
- Rewrite ASN1_STRING_cmp()
- Use calloc() for X509_CRL_METHOD_new() instead of malloc()
- Convert ASN1_PCTX_new() to calloc()
- Replace asn1_tlc_clear and asn1_tlc_clear_nc macros with a
function
- Consolidate {d2i,i2d}_{pr,pu}.c
- Remove handling of a NULL BUF_MEM from asn1_collect()
- Pull the recursion depth check up to the top of asn1_collect()
- Inline collect_data() in asn1_collect()
- Convert asn1_d2i_ex_primitive()/asn1_collect() from BUF_MEM to CBB
- Clean up d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN() and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN()
- Consolidate ASN.1 universal tag type data
- Rewrite ASN.1 identifier/length parsing in CBS
- Make OBJ_obj2nid() work correctly with NID_undef
- tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint is now an uint32_t
- Untangle ssl3_get_message() return values
- Rename tls13_buffer to tls_buffer
- Fold DTLS_STATE_INTERNAL into DTLS1_STATE
- Provide a way to determine our maximum legacy version
- Mop up enc_read_ctx and read_hash
- Fold SSL_SESSION_INTERNAL into SSL_SESSION
- Use ssl_force_want_read in the DTLS code
- Add record processing limit to DTLS code
- Add explicit CBS_contains_zero_byte() check in CBS_strdup()
- Improve SNI hostname validation
- Ensure SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() is given a valid hostname
- Fix a strange check in the auto DH codepath
- Factor out/rewrite DHE key exchange
- Convert server serialisation of DHE parameters/public key to new
functions
- Check DH public key in ssl_kex_peer_public_dhe()
- Move the minimum DHE key size check into ssl_kex_peer_params_dhe()
- Clean up and refactor server side DHE key exchange
- Provide CBS_get_last_u8()
- Provide CBS_get_u64()
- Provide CBS_add_u64()
- Provide various CBS_peek_* functions
- Use CBS_get_last_u8() to find the content type in TLSv1.3 records
- unifdef TLS13_USE_LEGACY_CLIENT_AUTH
- Correct SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() when used with the TLSv1.3 stack
- Only allow zero length key shares when we know we're doing HRR
- Pull key share group/length CBB code up from
tls13_key_share_public()
- Refactor ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe() to separate parsing and
validation
- Return 0 on failure from send/get kex functions in the legacy
stack
- Rename tls13_key_share to tls_key_share
- Allocate and free the EVP_AEAD_CTX struct in
tls13_record_protection
- Convert legacy TLS client to tls_key_share
- Convert legacy TLS server to tls_key_share
- Stop attempting to duplicate the public and private key of dh_tmp
- Rename dh_tmp to dhe_params
- Rename CERT to SSL_CERT and CERT_PKEY to SSL_CERT_PKEY
- Clean up pkey handling in ssl3_get_server_key_exchange()
- Fix GOST skip certificate verify handling
- Simplify tlsext_keyshare_server_parse()
- Plumb decode errors through key share parsing code
- Simplify SSL_get_peer_certificate()
- Cleanup/simplify ssl_cert_type()
- The S3I macro was removed
- The openssl(1) cms and smime subcommands option handling was
converted and the C source was cleaned up.
* Documentation improvements
- 45 new manual pages, most of which were written from scratch.
Documentation coverage of ASN.1 and X.509 code has been
significantly improved.
* API additions and removals
- libssl
API additions
SSL_get0_verified_chain SSL_peek_ex SSL_read_ex SSL_write_ex
API stubs for compatibility
SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets
SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets
SSL_get_num_tickets SSL_set_num_tickets
- libcrypto
added API (some of these were previously available as macros):
ASIdOrRange_free ASIdOrRange_new ASIdentifierChoice_free
ASIdentifierChoice_new ASIdentifiers_free ASIdentifiers_new
ASN1_TIME_diff ASRange_free ASRange_new BIO_get_callback_ex
BIO_get_init BIO_set_callback_ex BIO_set_next
BIO_set_retry_reason BN_GENCB_set BN_GENCB_set_old
BN_abs_is_word BN_get_flags BN_is_negative
BN_is_odd BN_is_one BN_is_word BN_is_zero BN_set_flags
BN_to_montgomery BN_with_flags BN_zero_ex CTLOG_STORE_free
CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file
CTLOG_STORE_load_file CTLOG_STORE_new CTLOG_free
CTLOG_get0_log_id CTLOG_get0_name CTLOG_get0_public_key
CTLOG_new CTLOG_new_from_base64 CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time DH_get0_g DH_get0_p DH_get0_priv_key
DH_get0_pub_key DH_get0_q DH_get_length DSA_bits DSA_get0_g
DSA_get0_p DSA_get0_priv_key DSA_get0_pub_key DSA_get0_q
ECDSA_SIG_get0_r ECDSA_SIG_get0_s EVP_AEAD_CTX_free
EVP_AEAD_CTX_new EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data
EVP_MD_CTX_md_data EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx
EVP_MD_meth_dup EVP_MD_meth_free EVP_MD_meth_new
EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup
EVP_MD_meth_set_copy EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl EVP_MD_meth_set_final
EVP_MD_meth_set_flags EVP_MD_meth_set_init
EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size
EVP_MD_meth_set_update EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_check
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param_check EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public_check
EVP_PKEY_check EVP_PKEY_meth_set_check
EVP_PKEY_meth_set_param_check EVP_PKEY_meth_set_public_check
EVP_PKEY_param_check EVP_PKEY_public_check FIPS_mode
FIPS_mode_set IPAddressChoice_free IPAddressChoice_new
IPAddressFamily_free IPAddressFamily_new IPAddressOrRange_free
IPAddressOrRange_new IPAddressRange_free IPAddressRange_new
OBJ_get0_data OBJ_length OCSP_resp_get0_certs OCSP_resp_get0_id
OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at OCSP_resp_get0_respdata
OCSP_resp_get0_signature OCSP_resp_get0_signer
OCSP_resp_get0_tbs_sigalg PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional
RSA_get0_d RSA_get0_dmp1 RSA_get0_dmq1 RSA_get0_e RSA_get0_iqmp
RSA_get0_n RSA_get0_p RSA_get0_pss_params RSA_get0_q
SCT_LIST_free SCT_LIST_print SCT_LIST_validate SCT_free
SCT_get0_extensions SCT_get0_log_id SCT_get0_signature
SCT_get_log_entry_type SCT_get_signature_nid SCT_get_source
SCT_get_timestamp SCT_get_validation_status SCT_get_version
SCT_new SCT_new_from_base64 SCT_print SCT_set0_extensions
SCT_set0_log_id SCT_set0_signature SCT_set1_extensions
SCT_set1_log_id SCT_set1_signature SCT_set_log_entry_type
SCT_set_signature_nid SCT_set_source SCT_set_timestamp
SCT_set_version SCT_validate SCT_validation_status_string
X509_OBJECT_free X509_OBJECT_new X509_REQ_get0_pubkey
X509_SIG_get0 X509_SIG_getm X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted
X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain
X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify X509_STORE_get_verify
X509_STORE_get_verify_cb X509_STORE_set_verify
X509_get_X509_PUBKEY X509_get_extended_key_usage
X509_get_extension_flags X509_get_key_usage
X509v3_addr_add_inherit X509v3_addr_add_prefix
X509v3_addr_add_range X509v3_addr_canonize X509v3_addr_get_afi
X509v3_addr_get_range X509v3_addr_inherits
X509v3_addr_is_canonical X509v3_addr_subset
X509v3_addr_validate_path X509v3_addr_validate_resource_set
X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range X509v3_asid_add_inherit
X509v3_asid_canonize X509v3_asid_inherits
X509v3_asid_is_canonical X509v3_asid_subset
X509v3_asid_validate_path X509v3_asid_validate_resource_set
d2i_ASIdOrRange d2i_ASIdentifierChoice d2i_ASIdentifiers
d2i_ASRange d2i_IPAddressChoice d2i_IPAddressFamily
d2i_IPAddressOrRange d2i_IPAddressRange d2i_SCT_LIST
i2d_ASIdOrRange i2d_ASIdentifierChoice i2d_ASIdentifiers
i2d_ASRange i2d_IPAddressChoice i2d_IPAddressFamily
i2d_IPAddressOrRange i2d_IPAddressRange i2d_SCT_LIST
i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs i2d_re_X509_tbs i2o_SCT
i2o_SCT_LIST o2i_SCT o2i_SCT_LIST
removed API:
ASN1_check_infinite_end ASN1_const_check_infinite_end EVP_dss
EVP_dss1 EVP_ecdsa HMAC_CTX_cleanup HMAC_CTX_init
NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_free NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_new
NETSCAPE_PKEY_free NETSCAPE_PKEY_new NETSCAPE_X509_free
NETSCAPE_X509_new OBJ_bsearch_ex_ PEM_SealFinal PEM_SealInit
PEM_SealUpdate PEM_read_X509_CERT_PAIR
PEM_read_bio_X509_CERT_PAIR PEM_write_X509_CERT_PAIR
PEM_write_bio_X509_CERT_PAIR X509_CERT_PAIR_free
X509_CERT_PAIR_new X509_OBJECT_free_contents asn1_do_adb
asn1_do_lock asn1_enc_free asn1_enc_init asn1_enc_restore
asn1_enc_save asn1_ex_c2i asn1_get_choice_selector
asn1_get_field_ptr asn1_set_choice_selector check_defer
d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN d2i_NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY d2i_NETSCAPE_PKEY
d2i_NETSCAPE_X509 d2i_Netscape_RSA d2i_RSA_NET
d2i_X509_CERT_PAIR i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN i2d_NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY
i2d_NETSCAPE_PKEY i2d_NETSCAPE_X509 i2d_Netscape_RSA i2d_RSA_NET
i2d_X509_CERT_PAIR name_cmp obj_cleanup_defer

The LibreSSL project continues improvement of the codebase to reflect modern,
safe programming practices. We welcome feedback and improvements from the
broader community. Thanks to all of the contributors who helped make this
release possible.

[USN-5292-4] snapd regression

==========================================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5292-4
February 24, 2022

snapd regression
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 21.10
- Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
- Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
- Ubuntu 16.04 ESM
- Ubuntu 14.04 ESM

Summary:

USN-5292-1 introduced a regression in snapd.

Software Description:
- snapd: Daemon and tooling that enable snap packages

Details:

USN-5292-1 fixed a vulnerability in snapd. Unfortunately that update introduced
a regression that could break the fish shell. This update fixes the problem.

We apologize for the inconvenience.

Original advisory details:

James Troup discovered that snap did not properly manage the permissions for
the snap directories. A local attacker could possibly use this issue to expose
sensitive information. (CVE-2021-3155)

Ian Johnson discovered that snapd did not properly validate content interfaces
and layout paths. A local attacker could possibly use this issue to inject
arbitrary AppArmor policy rules, resulting in a bypass of intended access
restrictions. (CVE-2021-4120)

The Qualys Research Team discovered that snapd did not properly validate the
location of the snap-confine binary. A local attacker could possibly use this
issue to execute other arbitrary binaries and escalate privileges.
(CVE-2021-44730)

The Qualys Research Team discovered that a race condition existed in the snapd
snap-confine binary when preparing a private mount namespace for a snap. A
local attacker could possibly use this issue to escalate privileges and
execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2021-44731)

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following
package versions:

Ubuntu 21.10:
snap-confine 2.54.3+21.10.1ubuntu0.2
snapd 2.54.3+21.10.1ubuntu0.2

Ubuntu 20.04 LTS:
snap-confine 2.54.3+20.04.1ubuntu0.2
snapd 2.54.3+20.04.1ubuntu0.2

Ubuntu 18.04 LTS:
snap-confine 2.54.3+18.04.2ubuntu0.2
snapd 2.54.3+18.04.2ubuntu0.2

Ubuntu 16.04 ESM:
snap-confine 2.54.3+16.04.0ubuntu0.1~esm4
snapd 2.54.3+16.04.0ubuntu0.1~esm4

Ubuntu 14.04 ESM:
snap-confine 2.54.3+14.04.0ubuntu0.1~esm3
snapd 2.54.3+14.04.0ubuntu0.1~esm3

In general, a standard system update will make all the necessary changes.

References:
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5292-4
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5292-1
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/snapd/+bug/1961365, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/snapd/+bug/1961791

Package Information:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/snapd/2.54.3+21.10.1ubuntu0.2
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/snapd/2.54.3+20.04.1ubuntu0.2
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/snapd/2.54.3+18.04.2ubuntu0.2

Wednesday, February 23, 2022

OpenBSD Errata: February 24, 2022 (libexpat)

Errata patches for expat XML library have been released for OpenBSD
6.9 and 7.0.

Binary updates for the amd64, i386 and arm64 platform are available
via the syspatch utility. Source code patches can be found on the
respective errata page:

https://www.openbsd.org/errata69.html
https://www.openbsd.org/errata70.html

F37 Change: Boost 1.78 upgrade (System-Wide Change proposal)

https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/F37Boost178


== Summary ==
This change brings Boost 1.78 to Fedora. This will mean Fedora ships
with a recent upstream Boost release.

== Owner ==

* Name: [[User:trodgers| Thomas Rodgers]]
* Email: trodgers@redhat.com


== Detailed Description ==

The aim is to synchronize Fedora with the most recent Boost release.
Because ABI stability is absent from Boost, this entails rebuilding of
all dependent packages. This also entails the change owner assisting
maintainers of client packages in decoding cryptic boost-ese seen in
output from g++.

The equivalent changes for previous releases were
[[Changes/F35Boost176]], [[Changes/F34Boost175]],
[[Changes/F33Boost173]], [[Changes/F30Boost169|Fedora 30 Change]],
[[Changes/F29Boost167|Fedora 29 Change]], [[Changes/F28Boost166|Fedora
28 Change]], [[Changes/F27Boost164|Fedora 27 Change]],
[[Changes/F26Boost163|Fedora 26 Change]], [[Changes/F25Boost161|Fedora
25 Change]], [[Changes/F24Boost160|Fedora 24 Change]],
[[Changes/F23Boost159|Fedora 23 Change]] and
[[Changes/F22Boost158|Fedora 22 Change]].

== Benefit to Fedora ==

Fedora 37 includes Boost 1.78.

Fedora will stay relevant, as far as Boost clients are concerned.

Boost 1.78 does not bring any new components, but includes two new
header-only libraries from Boost 1.77 -
* Describe: A C++14 reflection library. Provides macros for describing
enumerators and struct/class members, and primitives for querying this
information.
* Lambda2: A C++14, dependency-free, single header lambda library.
Allows simple function objects to be constructed via expressions such
as _1 + 5, _1 % 2 == 0, _1 > _2, or _1 == ' ' || _1 == '\t'.

Boost 1.78 also includes many fixes and enhancements to existing components.

== Scope ==
* Proposal owners:
** Build will be done with Boost.Build v2 (which is the
upstream-sanctioned way of building Boost)
** Request a "f37-boost"
[https://docs.pagure.org/releng/sop_adding_side_build_targets.html
build system tag]
([http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/devel/2011-November/159908.html
discussion]):

** Build boost into that tag (take a look at the
[http://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/buildinfo?buildID=606493 build
#606493] for inspiration)
** Post a request for rebuilds to fedora-devel
** Work on rebuilding dependent packages in the tag.
** When most is done, re-tag all the packages to rawhide
** Watch fedora-devel and assist in rebuilding broken Boost clients
(by fixing the client, or Boost).

* Other developers:
** Those who depend on Boost DSOs will have to rebuild their packages.
Feature owners will alleviate some of this work as indicated above,
and will assist those whose packages fail to build in debugging them.


* Release engineering: TODO <!-- [https://pagure.io/releng/issue/9421
#9421
] --> (a check of an impact with Release Engineering is needed)

* Policies and guidelines:
** Apart from scope, this is business as usual, so no new policies, no
new guidelines.

* Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)


== Upgrade/compatibility impact ==
* No manual configuration or data migration needed.
* Some impact on other packages needing code changes to rebuild.
Historically this hasn't been too much of a problem and could always
be resolved before deadline.

== How To Test ==
* No special hardware is needed.
* Integration testing simply consists of installing Boost packages
(`dnf install boost`) on Fedora and checking that it does not break
other packages (see below for a way to obtain a list of boost
clients).


== User Experience ==
* Expected to remain largely the same.
* Developers building third-party software on Fedora may need to
rebuild against the new Boost packages, and may need to adjust their
code if the new Boost release is not source-compatible.

== Dependencies ==
Packages that must be rebuilt:
<code>$ dnf repoquery -s --releasever=rawhide --whatrequires
libboost\* --disablerepo=* --enablerepo=fedora | sort -u</code>

All clients:
<code>$ dnf repoquery --releasever=rawhide --archlist=src
--whatrequires boost-devel --disablerepo='*'
--enablerepo=fedora-source</code>

== Contingency Plan ==

* Contingency mechanism: Worst case scenario is to abandon the update
and simply ship F37 with Boost 1.76, which is already in rawhide.
* Blocks release? No
* Blocks product? None

== Documentation ==
* https://www.boost.org/users/history/version_1_78_0.html (released on
8th December 2021)
* https://www.boost.org/users/history/version_1_77_0.html (released on
11 August 2021)
* https://www.boost.org/development/index.html

== Release Notes ==


--
Ben Cotton
He / Him / His
Fedora Program Manager
Red Hat
TZ=America/Indiana/Indianapolis
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[arch-announce] Arch Linux Leader Election Results

This month we held our leader election, and our current leader Levente Polyák ran unopposed. As per [our election rules](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/DeveloperWiki:Project_Leader#Election) he is re-elected for a new term.

**Congratulations to Levente Polyak on a new term!**

URL: https://archlinux.org/news/arch-linux-leader-election-results/
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Tuesday, February 22, 2022

[USN-5302-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities

==========================================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5302-1
February 22, 2022

linux-oem-5.14 vulnerabilities
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 20.04 LTS

Summary:

Several security issues were fixed in the Linux kernel.

Software Description:
- linux-oem-5.14: Linux kernel for OEM systems

Details:

Yiqi Sun and Kevin Wang discovered that the cgroups implementation
in the Linux kernel did not properly restrict access to the cgroups
v1 release_agent feature. A local attacker could use this to gain
administrative privileges. (CVE-2022-0492)

Brendan Dolan-Gavitt discovered that the Marvell WiFi-Ex USB device
driver in the Linux kernel did not properly handle some error
conditions. A physically proximate attacker could use this to cause
a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2021-43976)

Wenqing Liu discovered that the f2fs file system implementation in the
Linux kernel did not properly validate inode types while performing
garbage collection. An attacker could use this to construct a malicious
f2fs image that, when mounted and operated on, could cause a denial
of service (system crash). (CVE-2021-44879)

Samuel Page discovered that the Transparent Inter-Process Communication
(TIPC) protocol implementation in the Linux kernel contained a
stack-based buffer overflow. A remote attacker could use this to
cause a denial of service (system crash) for systems that have a TIPC
bearer configured. (CVE-2022-0435)

Lyu Tao discovered that the NFS implementation in the Linux kernel
did not properly handle requests to open a directory on a regular
file. A local attacker could use this to expose sensitive information
(kernel memory). (CVE-2022-24448)

It was discovered that the YAM AX.25 device driver in the Linux kernel
did not properly deallocate memory in some error conditions. A local
privileged attacker could use this to cause a denial of service
(kernel memory exhaustion). (CVE-2022-24959)

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following
package versions:

Ubuntu 20.04 LTS:
linux-image-5.14.0-1024-oem 5.14.0-1024.26
linux-image-oem-20.04 5.14.0.1024.22
linux-image-oem-20.04b 5.14.0.1024.22
linux-image-oem-20.04c 5.14.0.1024.22
linux-image-oem-20.04d 5.14.0.1024.22

After a standard system update you need to reboot your computer to make
all the necessary changes.

ATTENTION: Due to an unavoidable ABI change the kernel updates have
been given a new version number, which requires you to recompile and
reinstall all third party kernel modules you might have installed.
Unless you manually uninstalled the standard kernel metapackages
(e.g. linux-generic, linux-generic-lts-RELEASE, linux-virtual,
linux-powerpc), a standard system upgrade will automatically perform
this as well.

References:
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5302-1
CVE-2021-43976, CVE-2021-44879, CVE-2022-0435, CVE-2022-0492,
CVE-2022-24448, CVE-2022-24959

Package Information:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-oem-5.14/5.14.0-1024.26

[USN-5301-2] Cyrus SASL vulnerability

==========================================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5301-2
February 22, 2022

cyrus-sasl2 vulnerability
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 16.04 ESM
- Ubuntu 14.04 ESM

Summary:

Cyrus SASL could run programs if it received specially crafted network
traffic.

Software Description:
- cyrus-sasl2: Cyrus Simple Authentication and Security Layer

Details:

USN-5301-1 fixed a vulnerability in Cyrus. This update provides
the corresponding update for Ubuntu 14.04 ESM and Ubuntu 16.04 ESM.

Original advisory details:

It was discovered that the Cyrus SASL SQL plugin incorrectly handled SQL
input. A remote attacker could use this issue to execute arbitrary SQL
commands.

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following
package versions:

Ubuntu 16.04 ESM:
libsasl2-modules-sql 2.1.26.dfsg1-14ubuntu0.2+esm1

Ubuntu 14.04 ESM:
libsasl2-modules-sql 2.1.25.dfsg1-17ubuntu0.1~esm2

After a standard system update you need to reboot your computer to make
all the necessary changes.

References:
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5301-2
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5301-1
CVE-2022-24407

[USN-5300-1] PHP vulnerabilities

==========================================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5300-1
February 22, 2022

php7.0 vulnerabilities
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 16.04 ESM

Summary:

Several security issues were fixed in PHP.

Software Description:
- php7.0: HTML-embedded scripting language interpreter

Details:

It was discovered that PHP incorrectly handled certain scripts.
An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service.
(CVE-2015-9253, CVE-2017-8923, CVE-2017-9118, CVE-2017-9120)

It was discovered that PHP incorrectly handled certain inputs.
An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service,
or possibly obtain sensitive information. (CVE-2017-9119)

It was discovered that PHP incorrectly handled certain scripts with XML
parsing functions.
An attacker could possibly use this issue to obtain sensitive information.
(CVE-2021-21707)

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following
package versions:

Ubuntu 16.04 ESM:
php7.0-cgi 7.0.33-0ubuntu0.16.04.16+esm3
php7.0-cli 7.0.33-0ubuntu0.16.04.16+esm3
php7.0-fpm 7.0.33-0ubuntu0.16.04.16+esm3

In general, a standard system update will make all the necessary changes.

References:
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5300-1
CVE-2015-9253, CVE-2017-8923, CVE-2017-9118, CVE-2017-9119,
CVE-2017-9120, CVE-2021-21707

[USN-5301-1] Cyrus SASL vulnerability

==========================================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-5301-1
February 22, 2022

cyrus-sasl2 vulnerability
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 21.10
- Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
- Ubuntu 18.04 LTS

Summary:

Cyrus SASL could run programs if it received specially crafted network
traffic.

Software Description:
- cyrus-sasl2: Cyrus Simple Authentication and Security Layer

Details:

It was discovered that the Cyrus SASL SQL plugin incorrectly handled SQL
input. A remote attacker could use this issue to execute arbitrary SQL
commands.

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following
package versions:

Ubuntu 21.10:
libsasl2-modules-sql 2.1.27+dfsg-2.1ubuntu0.1

Ubuntu 20.04 LTS:
libsasl2-modules-sql 2.1.27+dfsg-2ubuntu0.1

Ubuntu 18.04 LTS:
libsasl2-modules-sql 2.1.27~101-g0780600+dfsg-3ubuntu2.4

After a standard system update you need to reboot your computer to make
all the necessary changes.

References:
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-5301-1
CVE-2022-24407

Package Information:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/cyrus-sasl2/2.1.27+dfsg-2.1ubuntu0.1
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/cyrus-sasl2/2.1.27+dfsg-2ubuntu0.1

https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/cyrus-sasl2/2.1.27~101-g0780600+dfsg-3ubuntu2.4

F37 Change: Curl-minimal as default (System-Wide Change proposal)

https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CurlMinimal_as_Default

== Summary ==
`libcurl-minimal` and `curl-minimal` will be installed by default
instead of `libcurl` and `curl`.
The "minimal" variants provide only a subset of protocols (HTTP, HTTPS, FTP).
The full versions can be explicitly requested as `libcurl-full` and `curl-full`.

== Owner ==
* Name: [[User:Zbyszek| Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek]]
* Email: zbyszek at in.waw.pl
* Name: [[User:Kdudka| Kamil Dudka]]
* Email: kdudka at redhat.com


== Detailed Description ==

The `curl` package provides two sets of subpackages: `curl`+`libcurl`
and `curl-minimal`+`libcurl+minimal`.
`curl-minimal`+`libcurl-minimal` are compiled with various
semi-obsolete protocols and infrequently-used features disabled:
DICT, GOPHER, IMAP, LDAP, LDAPS, MQTT, NTLM, POP3, RTSP, SMB, SMTP,
SFTP, SCP, TELNET, TFTP, brotli compression, IDN2 names.

(Both variants support HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP.)

`curl-minimal` has `Provides:curl` and `libcurl-minimal` has `Provides:libcurl`.
This means that both sets can be used to satisfy a dependency on
`curl` or `libcurl`.
`curl` has the virtual `Provides:curl-full` and `libcurl` has the
virtual `Provides:libcurl-full`.
The user or another package can explicitly pull in the full variants,
e.g. with `dnf install curl-full`
or `Requires: libcurl-full`.
With this change, `Suggests: libcurl-minimal` or `Suggests:
curl-minimal` will be added to a few packages
that already have a dependency on `libcurl` or `curl`.
Currently, doing this for `systemd` and `rpm` is planned.
Effectively, `dnf` will install the minimal variants, unless another
package has a stronger dependency on the full variants.


== Benefit to Fedora ==
There are two separate motivations for this.

Those infrequently used protocols are less tested than the common ones
and are a source of security bugs.
Most users are not using those protocols anyway, so disabling them
reduces the bug and attack surface.
(In fact, many applications already call `curl_easy_setopt(c,
CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, …)` to internally
limit what protocols are supported. So even if `libcurl` is swapped
for `libcurl-minimal` for many
uses this will not be a difference.)

The packages for the minimal variants are smaller:
a trivial installation with `curl-minimal`+`libcurl+minimal` is 18 MB
download, 57 MB installed size, 50 packages;
the same with `curl-full` and `libcurl-full` is 21 MB download, 65
installed size, 62 packages.
Thus we save 8 MB, reducing the initial size by 12%.

== Scope ==
* Proposal owners:
Create pull requests to add `Suggests: curl-minimal` or `Suggests:
libcurl-minimal` as appropriate
to packages which already require `curl` or `libcurl`: `rpm` and `systemd`.
This means that any installation (which should be most of them) will
get the minimal variants.

* Other developers:
For packages that use the full variants: add `Recommends: curl-full`
or `Recommends: libcurl-full` or
`Requires: curl-full` or `Requires: libcurl-full` as appropriate.

* Release engineering:
* Policies and guidelines: N/A (not needed for this Change)
* Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)
* Alignment with Objectives:

== Upgrade/compatibility impact ==
Users who use curl or another application which uses libcurl with the
removed protocols will lose support for those protocols. They will
need to explicitly install the full variants.

== How To Test ==
`dnf swap curl curl-minimal` or `dnf swap libcurl libcurl-minimal` and
check that `curl` and other applications using `libcurl` still work.

== User Experience ==
This should be not be noticed by users, except as noted above in
Upgrade/compatibility impact.

== Dependencies ==

== Contingency Plan ==

Remove the additions of Suggests, or even add explicit Recommends or Requires.
* Contingency deadline: any time, possibly even after the final release
* Blocks release? No

== Documentation ==
This page should be enough.

== Release Notes ==
`curl-minimal` and `libcurl-minimal` are installed by default. The
support for various obsolete protocols is unavailable by default
through curl (DICT, GOPHER, IMAP, LDAP, LDAPS, MQTT, NTLM, POP3, RTSP,
SMB, SMTP, SFTP, SCP, TELNET, TFTP, brotli compression, IDN2 names).


--
Ben Cotton
He / Him / His
Fedora Program Manager
Red Hat
TZ=America/Indiana/Indianapolis
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Fedora 36 Bodhi updates-testing Activation and Beta Freeze

Hi all,

Today's an important day on the Fedora 36 schedule[1], with several
significant cut-offs. First of all, today is the Bodhi updates-testing
activation point [2]. That means that from now all Fedora 36 packages must be submitted to updates-testing and pass the relevant
requirements[3] before they will be marked as 'stable' and moved to
the fedora repository.

Today is also the Beta freeze[4]. This means that only packages which
fix accepted blocker or freeze exception bugs[5][6] will be marked as
'stable' and included in the Beta composes. Other builds will remain
in updates-testing until the Beta release is approved, at which point
the Beta freeze is lifted and packages can move to 'stable' as usual
until the Final freeze.

Today is also the Software String freeze[7], which means that strings
marked for translation in Fedora-translated projects should not now be
changed for Fedora 36.

Finally, today is the 'completion deadline' Change Checkpoint[8],
meaning that Fedora 36 Changes must now be 'feature complete or close
enough to completion that a majority of its functionality can be
tested'. All tracking bugs should be on ON_QA state or later to
reflect this.

Regards
Tomáơ Hrčka

[1] https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-36/f-36-key-tasks.html
[2] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Updates_Policy#Bodhi_enabling
[3] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Updates_Policy#Branched_release
[4] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Milestone_freezes
[5] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/QA:SOP_blocker_bug_process
[6] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/QA:SOP_freeze_exception_bug_process
[7] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/ReleaseEngineering/StringFreezePolicy
[8] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Policy